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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
DESTROYING OR TREATING WITH INDIGNITY
THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES:
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§372-75 (1971).
On February 17, 1971, the Thirty-third Legislature of
Oklahoma approved an emergency measure which amended
the existing state statute' concerning defilement of the United
States flag. The new law2 provides:
§372. Mutilation, treating with indignity or de-
stroying flag-
Definitions
(a) Any person who shall contemptuously or
maliciously tear down, burn, trample upon, mutilate,
deface, defile, defy, treat with indignity, wantonly de-
stroy, or cast contempt, either by word or act, upon
any flag, standard, colors or ensign of the United
States of America shall be guilty of a felony.
(b) The word "defile" as used in this section shall
include public conduct which brings shame or disgrace
upon any flag of the United States by its use for un-
patriotic or profane purpose.
(c) The terms "flag," "standard," "colors," or "en-
sign" of the United States as used in this section shall
include any picture, representation or part thereof
which an average person would believe, upon seeing
and without deliberation, to represent the flag, stand-
ard, colors or ensign of the United States of America.
SECTION 2. Severability
The provisions of this act are severable and if any
part or provision hereof shall be held void the de-
cision of the court so holding shall not affect or im-
pair any of the remaining parts or provisions of this
act.
' OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §372 (Supp. 1970).
2 Okla. Laws 1971, 1.
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The.1971 Act added section 2 to the existing statute. This
addition provided for the severability of any provisions of the
Act in case they be held void. The severability provision was
apparently added in recognition of various United States Su-
preme Court rulings which may make strict application of
the statute unconstitutional. The Oklahoma Legislature seem-
ed cognizant of this possibility, but made the provisions of
the act severable rather than rewriting the statute.
This does not provide a workable standard for defining
flag desecration, nor will it keep the Oklahoma statute from
running afoul of constitutional standards. It appears the leg-
islature has abrogated its responsibility in this area.
The power of a state to enact legislation for the protec-
tion of the American flag has long been recognized. In Halter
v. Nebraska,3 the United States Supreme Court held that a
Nebraska statute prohibiting the use of representations of the
flag for advertising articles of merchandise was not repugnant
to the United States Constitution. The opinion by Mr. Justice
Harlan indicated that a state may exercise its power to "en-
courage patriotism and love of country among its people....
Therefore a state will be wanting in care for the well-being
of its people if it ignores the fact that they regard the flag
as a symbol of their country's power and prestige, and will
be impatient if any open disrespect is shown towards it."
More recently, the courts have concerned themselves with
the aspects of protected symbolic speech that may be abridged
under flag desecration statutes. This presents a balancing of
interests between the individual's rights and the government's
powers. The main difficulty is ascertaining what conduct of
the individual is protected. Mr. Chief Justice Warren faced
this problem in United States v. O'Brien,5 a case dealing with
3 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
4 Id. at 42.
t 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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the burning of selective service cards. In writing the opinion
he stated:
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limit-
less variety of conduct can be labeled "speech" when-
ever the person engaging in the conduct intends there-
by to express an idea .... This Court has held that
when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are com-
bined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms.0
Despite the language of the O'Brien case, the Court's de-
cision in Street v. New York 7 makes it clear that a flag de-
secration statute such as Oklahoma's which provides a penalty
for defiling the United States flag by either word or act may
abridge a man's right to publicly express his opinion about
the flag. In the Street case, the accused burned an American
flag on a street corner after learning that civil rights leader
James Meredith had been shot by a sniper in Mississippi. Dur-
ing the burning, a policeman heard the accused state: "If
they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag"
and "We don't need no damn flag." Street had been convict-
ed under a New York statute making it a misdemeanor pub-
licly to mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon or
cast contempt upon, either by words or act any flag of the
United States." In Street, the Court reversed the accused's
conviction stating:
[W]e are unable to sustain a conviction that may have
rested on a form of expression, however distasteful,
which the Constitution tolerates and protects.0
The Court reached this decision after being "unable to
say with certainty that appellant's words were not an inde-
6 Id. at 376.
7 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
8 N.Y. PFmAL LAW §1425(16) (d) (1909) (superseded 1967 by
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §136(d) (McKinney 1968)).
9 394 U.S. at 594.
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pendent cause of his conviction."' 0 It would appear that any
attempt to convict under the Oklahoma statute would have
the risk of this same danger, as it provides a penalty for de-
secrating the flag by either word or act. Thus, any conviction
must be based predominantly on the accused's actions.
The Street Court found four governmental interests which
might have been furthered by punishing the accused for his
words:
(1) to deter appellant from vocally inciting others to
commit unlawful acts
(2) to prevent appellant from uttering inflammatory
words that would provoke others to retaliate
against him
(3) to protect the sensibilities of passers-by who
might be shocked by appellant's words about the
flag
(4) to assure that appellant showed proper respect for
the national emblem."
Despite these enumerated interests, a problem is foreseen
any time an accused is tried under Oklahoma's statute when
his conduct consists of both words and acts. In Cowgill v.
California,2 the Court dismissed the appeal of Cowgill from
his conviction under a California statute'3 for wearing a vest
fashioned out of a cut-up American flag. In the Court's dis-
missal it stated:
The Court has, as yet, not established a test for de-
termining at what point conduct becomes so inter-
twined with expression that it becomes necessary to
weigh the state's interest in proscribing conduct
10 Id. at 589.
11 Id. at 590-91.
12 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal dis-
missed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).
13 CAL. MmiTARY mm VEER~s CODE. §614(d) (West 1954)
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against the constitutionally protected interest in free-
dom of expression. 4
California has seen fit to apply its statute to acts only, which
is the same thing that the federal government has done.15 This
seems to be a reasonable approach to the balancing of in-
terests and one that the Oklahoma legislature might follow.
If the Oklahoma statute applied to acts only and the terms
used therein were more narrowly defined, the statute would
seem to come closer to meeting the constitutional standards.
As the court stated in Hodsdon v. Buckson:16
The danger of chilling the exercise of fundamental
freedoms, especially those protected by t h e First
Amendment, requires that when the conduct regu-
lated approaches a protected zone, government regu-
late only with narrow specificity.17
The Oklahoma legislature should rewrite this statute so
that it would protect the flag from acts of mutilation, but
so that its provisions could not be arbitrarily applied to abridge
an individual's right of free expression.
J. Richard Johnson, Jr.
14 396 U.S. at 371.
'r 18 U.S.C. §700 (a) (Supp. IV 1968).
16 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
17 Id. at 532.
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